000			03391cam a2200253u 4500
999			_c13311 _d13311
020			_a9780262572378
082			_a330.015193 MO RA
245	0	0	_aMoral sentiments and material interests : _bthe foundations of cooperation in economic life / _cedited by Herbert Gintis ... [et al.].
260			_aCambridge, Mass. : _bMIT Press, _cc2005.
300			_axii, 404 p. : _bill ; _c24 cm.
500			_aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
520			_aMoral Sentiments and Material Interests presents an innovative synthesis of research in different disciplines to argue that cooperation stems not from the stereotypical selfish agent acting out of disguised self-interest but from the presence of "strong reciprocators" in a social group. Presenting an overview of research in economics, anthropology, evolutionary and human biology, social psychology, and sociology, the book deals with both the theoretical foundations and the policy implications of this explanation for cooperation. Chapter authors in the remaining parts of the book discuss the behavioral ecology of cooperation in humans and nonhuman primates, modeling and testing strong reciprocity in economic scenarios, and reciprocity and social policy. The evidence for strong reciprocity in the book includes experiments using the famous Ultimatum Game (in which two players must agree on how to split a certain amount of money or they both get nothing.).
650		4	_aCooperation. _98835
650		4	_aGame theory. _95985
650		4	_aEconomics _xSociological aspects. _91274
700			_aGintis, Herbert., _eEditor. _946570
700			_aBowles, Samuel, _eEditor. _946571
700			_aBoyd, Robert, _eEditor. _946572
700			_aFehr, Ernst, _eEditor. _946573
856			_uhttps://uowd.box.com/s/3imhp81v3t8qrb4vtme6a4pclhcfymso _zLocation Map