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Moral psychology : free will and moral responsibility : vol. 4 /

Title By: Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter [Edited by]
Material type: BookPublisher: Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, c2014.Description: xvii, 474 p. : ill. ; 23 cm.ISBN: 9780262525473Subject(s): Ethics | Psychology and philosophy | NeurosciencesDDC classification: 170 Online resources: Location Map
Summary:
Traditional philosophers approached the issues of free will and moral responsibility through conceptual analysis that seldom incorporated findings from empirical science. In recent decades, however, striking developments in psychology and neuroscience have captured the attention of many moral philosophers. This volume of Moral Psychology offers essays, commentaries, and replies by leading philosophers and scientists who explain and use empirical findings from psychology and neuroscience to illuminate old and new problems regarding free will and moral responsibility. The contributors -- who include such prominent scholars as Patricia Churchland, Daniel Dennett, and Michael Gazzaniga -- consider issues raised by determinism, compatibilism, and libertarianism; epiphenomenalism, bypassing, and naturalism; naturalism; and rationality and situationism. These writings show that although science does not settle the issues of free will and moral responsibility, it has enlivened the field by asking novel, profound, and important questions.
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Item type Home library Call number Status Date due Barcode Item holds
REGULAR University of Wollongong in Dubai
Main Collection 		170 MO RA (Browse shelf) Available T0051754
Total holds: 0

"A Bradford Book."

Includes bibliographical references and indexes.

Traditional philosophers approached the issues of free will and moral responsibility through conceptual analysis that seldom incorporated findings from empirical science. In recent decades, however, striking developments in psychology and neuroscience have captured the attention of many moral philosophers. This volume of Moral Psychology offers essays, commentaries, and replies by leading philosophers and scientists who explain and use empirical findings from psychology and neuroscience to illuminate old and new problems regarding free will and moral responsibility. The contributors -- who include such prominent scholars as Patricia Churchland, Daniel Dennett, and Michael Gazzaniga -- consider issues raised by determinism, compatibilism, and libertarianism; epiphenomenalism, bypassing, and naturalism; naturalism; and rationality and situationism. These writings show that although science does not settle the issues of free will and moral responsibility, it has enlivened the field by asking novel, profound, and important questions.

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