Debating procreation : is it wrong to reproduce? /
By: Benatar, David
Title By: Wasserman, David
Material type: BookPublisher: Oxford , New York : Oxford University Press, c2015.Description: vi, 269 p. ; 23 cm.ISBN: 9780199333547; 9780199333547 (hardcover : alk. paper)Subject(s): Human reproduction -- Moral and ethical aspects | Life -- Moral and ethical aspectsDDC classification: 176 Online resources: Location MapItem type | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds |
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REGULAR | University of Wollongong in Dubai Main Collection | 176 DA DE (Browse shelf) | Available | T0018757 |
, Shelving location: Main Collection Close shelf browser
175 PL ME Media ethics : | 175 RE AD Readings in cyberethics / | 175 RE AD Readings in cyberethics / | 176 DA DE Debating procreation : | 176 EL DE Designer babies : | 176 ET HI The ethics of human cloning / | 177.3 JA UN Unspun : |
Includes index.
Introducing anti-natalism -- The asymmetry argument -- The quality of life argument -- The misanthropic argument -- Contra procreation -- Better to have lived and lost? -- Against anti-natalism -- The good of the future child and the parent-child relationship as goals of procreation -- Impersonal constraints on procreation -- Alternatives to impersonal approaches: birthrights and role-based duties.
While procreation is ubiquitous, attention to the ethical issues involved in creating children is relatively rare. In Debating Procreation, David Benatar and David Wasserman take opposing views on this important question. David Benatar argues for the anti-natalist view that it is always wrong to bring new people into existence. He argues that coming into existence is always a serious harm and that even if it were not always so, the risk of serious harm is sufficiently great to make procreation wrong. In addition to these "philanthropic" arguments, he advances the "misanthropic" one that because humans are so defective and cause vast amounts of harm, it is wrong to create more of them. David Wasserman defends procreation against the anti-natalist challenge. He outlines a variety of moderate pro-natalist positions, which all see procreation as often permissible but never required. After criticizing the main anti-natalist arguments, he reviews those pronatalist positions. He argues that constraints on procreation are best understood in terms of the role morality of prospective parents, considers different views of that role morality, and argues for one that imposes only limited constraints based on the well-being of the future child. He then argues that the expected good of a future child and of the parent-child relationship can provide a strong justification for procreation in the face of expected adversities without giving individuals any moral reason to procreate.