Modeling strategic behavior : a graduate introduction to game theory and mechanism design
By: Mailath, George Joseph
Material type:
BookSeries: World Scientific lecture notes in economics and policy ; 6.Publisher: New Jersey : World Scientific Publishing, c2019.Description: xii, 351 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.ISBN: 9789811200762; 9789813239937Subject(s): Game theory | Equilibrium (Economics) | MacroeconomicsDDC classification: 330.015193 MA MO Online resources: Location Map | Item type | Home library | Call number | Status | Notes | Date due | Barcode | Item holds |
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| REGULAR | University of Wollongong in Dubai Main Collection | 330.015193 MA MO (Browse shelf) | Available | Mar2020 | T0064379 |
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| 330.015192 EN AP Applied econometric time series / | 330.015192 MC PR Probability foundations of economic theory | 330.015193 HA GA Games, strategies, and decision making | 330.015193 MA MO Modeling strategic behavior : | 330.015193 MO RA Moral sentiments and material interests : | 330.0151932 LA DI Differential games in industrial economics | 330.015195 AN ME Methods for estimation and inference in modern econometrics / |
Formerly CIP. Uk
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Game theory in economics -- Normal and extensive form games -- A first look at equilibrium -- Games with nature -- Nash equilibrium: existence and foundations -- Renements in dynamic games -- Signaling -- Repeated games -- Topics in dynamic games -- Bargaining -- Introduction to mechanism design -- Dominant strategy mechanism design -- Bayesian mechanism design -- Principal agency -- Appendices.
It is impossible to understand modern economics without knowledge of the basic tools of game theory and mechanism design. This book provides a graduate-level introduction to the economic modeling of strategic behavior. The goal is to teach Economics doctoral students the tools of game theory and mechanism design that all economists should know.